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This paper has been prepared for the First Annual Conference for Development and 
Change (ACDC) -- Trespassing In Development Theory and Practice: Towards a New 
International Policy Agenda, Antigua, Guatemala, July 28- July 30, 2003. It is a short 
summary of research reported in Epstein (2000, 2002), Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2002), 
and Epstein and Power (2003). The paper has benefited from the excellent research 
reported in Pollin (1993 and 1998) as well as from participants’ comments in seminars 
where these ideas have been presented, including the IDEAS conference in Chennai, 
India, the NEDLAC conference at Johannesburg, South Africa, and at Gender and 
Macroeconomics Conferences at the Levy Institute and University of Utah, in Salt Lake 
City. Some of this research was supported by grants from the Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations to the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI). Of course, I am 
responsible for remaining errors and omissions. 
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Abstract 
 
Many countries in the developing world have adopted an approach to 
monetary policy that focuses on maintaining a low level of inflation, to the 
exclusion of other important objectives such as employment generation, 
increasing investment or reducing poverty, despite the widespread 
evidence that moderate levels of inflation have few or no costs. Some have 
even adopted formal “inflation targeting”, an approach which commits the 
central bank to hitting a fairly rigid inflation target, often as low as 2%. 
However, this focus has led to slower economic growth and lower 
employment growth, without succeeding in lowering inflation at a smaller 
economic cost than traditional methods of inflation fighting. Clearly, it is 
time to find an alternative to inflation targeting. 
 
This paper presents the real targeting approach to monetary policy, which 
I argue is superior alternative to the costly and ineffective inflation 
targeting approach. Under this real targeting approach, central banks are 
given a country appropriate target such as employment growth, 
unemployment, real GDP or investment, usually subject to an inflation 
constraint. Given these two targets – the real target and the constraint – the 
central bank will find multiple tools to reach these targets, designing new 
tools and rediscovering old tools such as asset based reserve requirements 
and other credit allocation techniques. The real targeting approach might 
also be complemented by other policies, such as capital management 
techniques to deal with possible capital flight. The real targeting approach 
has the potential to make central bank policy more transparent, more 
accountable, and more socially useful than most currently existing central 
bank structures. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
During the last decade, central banks in developing countries have increasingly 
adopted approaches to monetary policy that focus on lowering the rate of inflation with 
little regard to their impact on "real factors" such as poverty, employment, investment or 
economic growth. Among these approaches, "inflation targeting" is the most prominent 
(Epstein, 2002). Following this strategy, central banks attempt to hit a target range for 
inflation while mostly ignoring the impact of monetary policy on other economic 
variables. As of 2001, more than nineteen countries had adopted inflation targeting and 
more countries are considering doing so (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001). Even 
where countries do not implement formal inflation targeting, many of them – under 
pressure from the IMF and other organizations – still orient policy almost exclusively to 
fighting inflation.  
 
In many countries, inflation targeting has generated significant costs – slow 
growth, sluggish employment generation and high real interest rates – while, yielding, at 
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most, minor benefit. Among the greatest disappointments for proponents of inflation 
targeting has been its apparent inability to reduce the so-called sacrifice ratio, the 
unemployment costs of fighting inflation (Epstein, 2000). 
 
This focus on fighting inflation to the exclusion of other ills is particularly 
puzzling in light of the well-known evidence that, assuming inflation is within moderate 
levels – less than 20-30% – as there are no negative consequences of inflation on 
important real variables (Bruno and Easterly, 1996; Epstein, 2000). By contrast, the costs 
of large scale unemployment and slow growth are high and well understood. South 
Africa, for example, where the unemployment rate is above 40%, seems singularly ill 
suited for such a policy, yet the South African Reserve Bank is an enthusiastic supporter 
of inflation targeting (Epstein, 2002) 
 
Hence, alternatives to this destructive monetary policy must be developed and 
promoted. Indeed, a central component of any macroeconomic policy framework which 
attempts to tackle the ills of poverty, high unemployment and slow economic growth in 
developing countries must develop a feasible and efficient framework for conducting 
monetary policy that is oriented to these variables, while, to be sure,  keeping inflation 
and other problems in check.  
 
Along these lines, this paper proposes a real targeting framework for central bank 
policy. In this approach, central banks choose a real target that is appropriate for that 
particular country – it will normally be poverty levels, employment growth, investment, 
or real economic growth – and choose a set of monetary policy instruments to achieve 
that target. Central to this strategy is the recognition that in order to achieve the chosen 
target, there will normally be other economic constraints that must be confronted, 
including, most notably, inflation and balance of payments or exchange rate constraints 
(Pollin, 1998). In this situation, the central bank will normally have to hit multiple targets 
and constraints and therefore – taking into account the classic Tinbergen analysis – it will 
need to implement several tools of monetary policy, including, perhaps, some new ones. 
 
This real targeting framwork has a number of important advantages. First and 
foremost, it places front and center the economic variables that have the most immediate 
and clearest association with social welfare. The central bank will be forced to identify 
this target and then reach it, and if it doesn't do so, both explain why it failed and how it 
will improve in the next period. Second, given the public pressure to reach this target, the 
central bank will have significant incentives to invest in research and other activities to 
improve its understanding and tools to reach this real target. Third, given that it will need 
to reach this target and other constraints, it will need to develop new tools of monetary 
policy. For example, if a central bank must hit an employment target subject to an 
inflation and balance of payments constraint, then – in addition to interest rate policy – it 
might explore asset allocation strategies to encourage banks to lend more to high 
employment generating uses, and capital control techniques to manage balance of 
payments problems (Pollin, 1993; Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, K.S., 2003).  Fourth, a real 
targeting approach lends itself naturally to a more democratic, transparent and 
accountable central bank policy that serves the genuine needs of the majority of 
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countries’ citizens, rather than the minority that typically benefits from the combination 
of slower growth, low inflation, and high real interest rates. Fifth, the framework is much 
more conducive to tailoring monetary policy to the specific needs of different countries. 
For example, if a country has a particular problem with generating good jobs for women, 
or more jobs in a particular region of the country,  then the real targeting approach can 
target women’s employment or more employment in a specific region (along with more 
employment generally) and devise instruments to achieve those objectives. In short, the 
real targeting approach to monetary policy is likely to be more relevant, flexible and 
effective than inflation targeting. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next section briefly summarizes 
the inflation targeting approach to monetary policy and evaluates the evidence 
concerning its impacts; section three presents the real targeting approach to monetary 
policy, including its associated targets and instruments, and describes the benefits that 
can result from such a strategy. After that, section four describes the complementary 
policies which need to accompany the real target approach while section five considers 
some possible objections to real targeting. The final section briefly discusses future 
research required to develop this approach. 
 
 
II. A Critique of Inflation Targeting 
 
According to its advocates, "full fledged" inflation targeting consists of five 
components: absence of other nominal anchors, such as exchange rates or nominal GDP; 
an institutional commitment to price stability; absence of fiscal dominance; policy 
(instrument) independence; and policy transparency and accountability (Mishkin and  
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001, p. 3; Bernanke, et. al. 1999).1 In practice, while few central banks 
reach the "ideal" of being "full fledged" inflation targeters, the vast majority still focus on 
fighting inflation to the virtual exclusion of other goals. The overriding announced goal 
of inflation targeting central banks is typically “price stability”, usually defined to be an 
inflation rate of about 2%. (Ibid., p. 99). In addition, inflation targeting is usually 
associated with changes in the law that enhance the independence of the central bank 
(Ibid., p. 102; Mishkin and Scmidt-Hebbel, 2001, p. 8). 
 
 “Inflation targeting” is a particular example of the “neo-liberal” approach to  
central banking. Neo-liberal central banks attempt to: keep inflation at a very low level; 
reduce central bank support for government fiscal deficits; help manage the country’s 
integration into world trade and financial markets; dramatically reduce the influence of 
democratic social and political forces on central bank policy. 
 
The major claims made by advocates of inflation targeting are that it will2: 
                                                 
1 The oddest idea in this list is the notion that inflation targeting increases "accountability” considering that 
it requires the central bank to follow a relatively rigid rule not subject to input from the bulk of the 
population. 
 
2 See Berneke, et. al. (1999) and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) for recent surveys. 
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• Reduce the rate of inflation 
• Enhance the credibility of monetary policy 
• Reduce the sacrifice ratio associated with contractionary monetary policy 
• Help to attract foreign investment 
 
The evidence on these claims is mainly in the negative. It is true that countries 
that adopt inflation targeting often achieve lower inflation rates, but they do not do so at 
any lower cost than other countries in terms of forgone output. That is, inflation targeting 
does not appear to increase the credibility of central bank policy and therefore, doe not 
appear to reduce the sacrifice ratio. (See Bernanke, et. al, 1999 and Epstein, 2000, for 
detailed surveys of the literature). Central banks that reduce inflation do so the old-
fashioned way: by raising interest rates, causing recessions or slow growth, and by 
throwing people out of work. Moreover, there is no evidence that countries adopting 
inflation targeting manage to attract more useable foreign investment. 
 
There is a further, more basic problem with inflation targeting and the neo-liberal 
approach to central bank policy more generally. Why is there such a focus on fighting 
inflation to the exclusion of other goals? As reported in Bruno and Easterly (1996) and 
Epstein (2000, 2002) there is a great deal of evidence that moderate rates of inflation, 
inflation up to 20% or more, has no predictable negative consequences on the real 
economy: it is not associated with slower growth, reduced investment, less foreign direct 
investment, or any other important real variable that one can find. Some have argued that 
inflation makes income distribution less equal and/or hurts the welfare of the poor in 
developing countries. More research needs to be done in this area because current work 
misses a fundamental point: the issue is not the impact of inflation per se, on the poor, 
but, rather, the impact of monetary policy designed to reduce the rate of inflation and to 
keep it low compared with the impact of monetary policy designed to generate more 
employment or more rapid economic growth. The relevant question is, is this kind of 
monetary policy bad for the poor? On this question, there is no clear consensus at all, 
primarily because the question has not been posed in this way. 
 
 If moderate rates of inflation have no obvious costs, then what can explain central 
banks’ obsession with inflation fighting, and the relentless promotion of inflation 
targeting and related policies by the IMF and other international economic organizations? 
One likely explanation is that a focus on fighting inflation and keeping it low and stable 
is in the interest of rentier groups in these countries. Epstein and Power (2003) present 
new calculations of rentier incomes in the OECD countries supporting the view that in 
many countries, higher real interest rates and lower inflation increase the rentier shares of 
income. 
 
 Given the failure of inflation targeting and neo-liberal central bank policy more 
generally, an alternative policy and policy structure, one that contributes to socially 
useful macroeconomic policy, must be developed.  
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III. Employment Targeting and Central Bank Policy 
  
 An alternative targeting approach would target “real” variables that contribute 
directly to economic welfare of the majority of the country’s residents. The advantage of 
a targeting approach is that it requires the central bank to identify its goals, makes 
transparent whether it is reaching that goal, and therefore potentially increases the 
accountability of the central bank to the general public. Of course, to make accountability 
a reality, additional political structures must be in place as well, an issue that is briefly 
discussed at the end of this paper. 
 
 What real variable should be targeted? This, obviously, will depend on the 
particular circumstances of the country involved. For some countries with a very large 
unemployment or underemployment problem, such as South Africa, employment 
targeting is a good candidate. In other cases, investment growth or real GDP growth 
would be more appropriate. Unlike the claims made by proponents of inflation targeting, 
the real targeting approach recognizes that one size does not necessarily fit all. 
 
 In this section I will develop one example, an employment targeting approach to 
monetary policy. Other examples, such as investment or real GDP targeting would share 
many of the components described here. 
 
Employment Targeting 
 
 With employment targeting, central banks would choose, or be given by the 
democratic authorities, an employment, employment growth or unemployment rate 
target. The central bank would be required to devise means (i.e., instruments) for 
achieving that target. If it fails to achieve the target during the allotted period, it would be 
required to explain why the target was not achieved, and to develop mechanisms for 
achieving the employment target in the next period. Targeting, implemented in this way, 
contributes to central bank transparency and accountability, and, in that sense, this 
approach takes an important leaf from the “inflation targeting” book. 
 
 As I mentioned earlier, the evidence indicates that if inflation gets high enough, it 
can create significant economic and social costs. Hence, no central bank can entirely 
ignore inflation. So in the employment targeting approach, central banks must achieve 
their employment target, subject to an inflation constraint. What the inflation constraint 
is should depend on the particular circumstances of the country involved. But whatever 
the level, as long as the constraint is binding or could be binding in a given period, an 
inflation constraint means that the central bank will essentially have two targets – 
employment and inflation. And as Jan Tinbergen famously put it, policy makers need as 
many independent instruments as they have independent targets. 
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 Central banks used to have many tools of monetary policy (of which I will speak 
more below.) But with the rise of neo-liberalism, including financial liberalization and 
the elimination of capital controls in many countries, most central banks have 
dramatically reduced the number of independent monetary tools they use, often to only 
one, namely, a short term interest rate. This one tool will not generally be sufficient to 
reach both an employment target and an inflation contstraint. Hence, the central bank will 
have to develop new tools (or dust off old ones) in order to implement this policy. 
 
 But the need for learning and innovation by the central bank will be much greater 
than this for a simple but profound reason: most central banks don’t really know very 
much about how to generate employment. The reasons for this are many, but the most 
important one is quite simple: for many years now, most central banks didn’t have to 
worry about generating employment because they were pressured only to be concerned 
about inflation (or the exchange rate). As a result, central banks (and associated 
economics researchers the world over) have devoted millions of dollars and countless 
hours on economic analysis and modeling to figure out the relationship between 
monetary policy and inflation while spending virtually nothing on discovering the 
relationship between monetary policy and employment generation. So not only will the 
central bank have to develop new instruments because they have more targets than 
instruments, but they will have to develop new instruments because the target is “new” 
and unfamiliar. 
 
 If this policy is implemented, will central banks actually engage in this research 
and develop this better understanding of the connection between monetary policy and 
employment in their countries? The answer is yes, because they will be required to meet 
these targets. If they do not meet them, they will have to explain why they did not do so, 
and how they are going to meet them in the next period. Careers will be on the line. 
Nothing focuses ones attention like the hangman’s noose, and the central bank will soon 
find itself in this situation. The result will be that the research economists at the central 
bank will start doing research on how to use monetary tools to generate more 
employment; they will consult with business, labor, organizations from the “informal 
economy”, maybe even NGO’s,  (to say nothing of the labor ministries in their own 
government) to try to develop approaches to generating more employment. Economists 
who develop a new and better understanding of the interest rate/employment nexus will 
be promoted, whereas heretofore, many were probably not even allowed to do such 
research. In fact, this re-orientation in research, and even a change in the culture of the 
central bank, will be one of the most important and long-lasting results of the re-
definition of the central bank target.  
 
 As central banks learn more about how to use monetary policy to increase 
employment, and as they develop new tools to reach this target subject to an inflation 
constraint, they might discover that they are re-inventing tools that were part of the 
standard central bank tool kit in the developing world in the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s. 
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These tools include credit allocation policies, support for development banks, and 
regulations in support of development lending. For the most part, policies such as these 
that were largely eliminated in the 90’s – sometimes for good reason, sometimes not – 
will be re-discovered, modernized and made better. 
 
New Targets, New Instruments  
 
 Central banks have many types of instruments they can develop or re-discover: 
these include quantitative regulations of financial institutions such as the direct credit 
allocation regulations, price based regulatory incentives for lenders such as asset-based 
reserve requirements, direct lending to financial institutions specializing in employment 
generation, and last, but far from least, macroeconomic policy tools such as open market 
operations and the direct manipulation of interest rates. 
 
 Direct credit allocation would involve the central bank establishing quotas which 
banks and other financial institutions would have to achieve in terms of certain types of 
lending: in this case, lending for employment generation. While this type of policy has 
been implemented in the past, many economists and policy makers generally prefer more 
price-based measures, which are available as well. 
 
 An important example of a price-based measure are so-called “asset-based reserve 
requirements” (eg. Pollin, 1993; Palley, 2000, 2003). With a program of asset-based 
reserve requirements, the central bank establishes differential reserve requirements that 
banks and other financial intermediaries must maintain, depending on the assets invested 
in by the banks. For example, the central bank can impose lower reserve requirements for 
favored assets such as loans that generate employment. Because it costs something to 
hold below-market-rate reserves, banks will have an incentive, all else equal, to lend 
more for the purposes desired by the central bank. 
 
 Another tool involves direct lending by the monetary authority to financial 
institutions that specialize in the appropriate kind of lending. For example, the central 
bank could lend to a development bank that specializes in loans for employment 
generation, or that specializes in lending to other lending institutions that do this. Or – 
and this may be less likely or less desirable – the central bank could lend directly to firms 
or other institutions generating employment. Another tool is that the central bank could 
provide loan guarantees, or help banks securitize lending for employment generation, 
much as the U.S. government helps Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitize lending for 
the housing market.  
 
Macroeconomic Policy 
 
 Theses credit allocation and other micro-based tools must be complemented by 
macroeconomic monetary policies that are conducive to successful employment 
generation. The point here is that an enabling macro environment is essential for these 
more micro techniques to work. This is because there must be a demand for credit for 
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employment generation, as well as the likelihood that such employment will generate 
profitable production, which depends on a buoyant economy. For both of these conditions 
to hold, there must be an expansionary macroeconomic environment, which can be 
facilitated by an appropriate interest rate policy. Of course, if the country approaches its 
inflation constraint, then short term interest rates might need to be oriented toward 
limiting inflationary tendencies. But if doing this interferes with hitting the employment 
targets for a significant period of time, then other ways of dealing with inflation might 
need to be found (see below). 
 
Defining Employment 
 
 So far I have assumed that the definition of employment is clear. However, as is 
well known, it is not. By employment do we need any kind of employment? Or formal 
sector employment? Employment of men? Or female employment? Employment 
anywhere in the country or employment in particular regions? Unless our monetary 
policy tools are completely neutral with respect to these categories, it makes a difference 
how we define the employment target. 
 
 While this could be seen as a problem for the approach, in fact it is a strength and 
opportunity. The employment targeting approach is flexible enough that those 
determining the can define employment in any way that makes sense for that society. So, 
for example, if there is a particular concern about women’s employment, then they can 
specify a target for overall employment as well as a target for women’s employment. The 
trick then will be to tailor the instruments to meet that target. Perhaps the central bank 
will choose to lend to financial intermediaries that have a special expertise in lending for 
female employment (including, perhaps, self-employment). This, then, is an example of 
how employment targeting could implement a gendered approach to central bank policy, 
and example that can be extended to other categories of workers or regions. 
 
 
IV. Complementary Institutions and Additional Considerations 
 
 Because a more expansionary monetary policy might lead to other constraints, a 
central bank that is oriented toward increasing employment is likely to require 
complementary policies to be successful.3 These problems might include excessive 
inflation and capital flight. In addition, further structural changes will be necessary to 
make central bank policy truly accountable.  In this section I deal briefly with each of 
these points. 
 
Inflation 
 
 The monetarist view that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon is false. More generally, excessive inflation is not likely to be a prominent 
problem resulting from an employment targeting approach, as long as other economic  
                                                 
3 This section partially draws on Pollin (1998). 
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policies of the government, including fiscal policy, are responsible, and as long as the 
economy is not subject to excessive external shocks. However, there could be occasions 
when excessive inflation rears its ugly head, and economic policy must be prepared to 
deal with it. 
 
 I already discussed monetary policy tools to limit inflation. As the central bank 
develops new tools to enhance employment growth, it can, if necessary, use traditional 
monetary policy tools such as short-term interest rates, to reach its inflation constraint. In 
some cases, when using interest rates to fight inflation without interfering with the 
employment growth target might not be feasible, the central bank might need to consider 
other policies, such as temporary incomes policies. The combination of policies required 
will vary depending on the country and the situation. 
 
Capital Flight 
 
 Foreign and domestic investors might speculate against the central bank policy, 
leading to capital flight or, more generally, downward pressure on exchange rates and 
foreign exchange reserves. Capital management techniques, such as capital controls, 
might be necessary to insulate the economy from such speculative flows. As Epstein, 
Grabel and Jomo (2003) show, countries use a variety of such techniques successfully to 
manage their economies. In fact, a wide range of economies –from “free market” 
Singapore to state managed People’s Republic of China – use forms of capital 
management techniques. These techniques can reduce downward pressure and the 
instability in exchange rates potentially resulting from employment targeting. This will 
not only help to stabilize the economy, but is also likely to reduce inflationary pressures 
that could result from such exchange rate movements. 
 
Democratizing Central Bank Policy 
 
 One of the major claims that advocates of inflation targeting make for the 
approach is that it will enhance the transparency and accountability of central bank 
policy. However, this is disingenuous – there is no discussion in this literature of what 
such accountability means (does it mean the “public” can choose between a target of 2 % 
inflation or 3% inflation?) or how accountability could be implemented.  It is clear, 
however, that no gimmick (such as a targeting approach) can generate true accountability 
by itself. Supporting institutions are required to make it a reality. 
 
 Similarly, while the employment targeting approach is ideally suited to facilitate 
accountability, it won’t do so automatically. It is ideally suited because the central bank 
will find that it will need the cooperation of labor and business groups, women’s groups, 
NGO’s and others if it is going to effectively use monetary policy to generate 
employment. But unless citizens and labor groups’ input into central bank decision 
making is institutionalized, even the employment targeting incentives will be unlikely to 
overcome the institutional inertia existing in most central banks that would make them 
quite reluctant to engage with such groups. Hence, institutions such as citizen’s advisory  
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councils, similar to those that exist in the U.S. Federal Reserve System, but with more 
real power, are likely to be necessary to create real accountability, even when an 
employment targeting approach is accepted. 
 
 
V. Possible Objections 
 
 Some will raise objections to the employment targeting approach specifically, or 
the real targeting approach more generally. The most common objection likely to come 
from mainstream economists is that monetary policy is incapable of affecting real 
variables, at least in the “long-run”. To adequately address this objection would require a 
separate paper, but here I would like to mention only a few key points.  There are both 
theoretical and empirical issues raised by this objection which need to be addressed. On 
the theoretical side, the notion that monetary policy cannot affect real variables is based 
on an incoherent Walrasian macroeconomic model common to neo-classical 
macroeconomics, a system that assumes away problems of uncertainty and 
unemployment. In Marxian, Keynesian, Kaleckian, Post-Keyesian and even New 
Keynesian approaches, there are strong reasons to believe that monetary policy can have 
long-run, real affects. 
 
 As an empirical matter, there is a vast literature. It includes strong evidence that 
monetary policy has real effects (see Epstein, 2000, for a brief survey.) 
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
 There is much work to be done to specify and devise practical real targeting 
approaches for a range of countries. Before central banks and politicians will accept such 
a change in policy structure, economists need to conduct research to specify how such a 
policy would likely work in a range of country cases. I believe that such studies would 
demonstrate that a real targeting approach is not only feasible, but would dramatically 
increase the social efficiency of central bank policy in developing countries. 
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